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This paper examines the performance of monetary policy under the new framework 
established in 1997 up to the end of the Labour government in May 2010. Performance was 
relatively good in the years before the crisis, but much weaker from 2008. The new 
framework largely neglected open economy issues, while the Treasury’s EMU assessment in 
2003 can be interpreted in different ways. inflation targeting in the UK and elsewhere may 
have contributed in some way to the eruption and depth of the financial crisis from 2008, but 
UK monetary policy responded in a bold and innovative way. Overall, the design and 
operation of monetary policy were much better than in earlier periods, but there remains 
scope for significant further evolution. 
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This paper covers the monetary policy framework and the decisions made within it over the 
lifetime of the Labour government. The first measure in this area taken by the new 
government in 1997 was to shift control of interest rates from the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (minister of finance) to a new Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) at the Bank of 
England (BoE). The MPC was and is in principle ‘independent’ of the government, but its 
members are chosen directly or indirectly by the government and it works to a remit 
(primarily a specific inflation target) set by the government. Thus, while it is clear that the 
government was responsible for the framework it must also assume some responsibility for 
the decisions taken by the MPC within that framework. There is no evidence that the 
decisions were out of line with what could have been expected from the framework, so this 
paper therefore considers them both, commenting where appropriate on the relationship 
between the two. 
 
Figure 1 shows the BoE’s policy rate (Bank rate) over the period (with the Labour 
government’s term defined by the vertical black lines), together with the Federal Reserve 
Board (Fed)’s Federal funds rate and the European Central Bank (ECB)’s main refinancing 
rate. The UK rate shows three clear upswings and three clear downswings: up from May 
1997 to June 1998 (there had been a rise also in October 1996); down from October 1998 to 
June 1999; up from September 1999 to February 2000; down from February 2001 to July 
2003; up from November 2003 to July 2007 (interrupted by a small cut in August 2004); and 
down from December 2007 to March 2009. It is noticeable that successive peaks, on the one 
hand, and successive troughs, on the other, were lower. While the UK policy rate moved 
broadly in line with international (US and euro area) rates, the UK rate was typically higher – 




Sections II-VI of the paper consider a range of issues: the new framework and the overall 
performance of policy (with an emphasis on the Great Moderation up to 2007); the sterling 
exchange rate and the balance between traded and non-traded sectors in the economy; the 
issue of the UK’s adoption of the euro; the eruption of the financial crisis, with particular 
attention to house prices; and the operation of policy in the early years of the crisis, up to the 
end of the Labour government in May 2010. Section VII offers some conclusions. 
 
II. The new framework and the overall performance of monetary policy 
How did the new monetary policy framework2 perform in the long tranquil period before the 
financial crisis? We consider in turn the change in the framework, the outturn for inflation 
and economic activity (in both the Great Moderation and the crisis period at the end of 
Labour’s term), the interest rate-setting behaviour of the MPC, some international 
comparisons and the appointment of MPC members. 
 
(1) Bank of England ‘independence’ 
In the new framework introduced in June 1997 the government continued to set the inflation 
target, but a new Monetary Policy Committee was given operational responsibility for setting 
interest rates so as to hit that target. The new legislation defined the BoE’s objective as “to 
maintain price stability and, subject to that objective, to support the government’s economic 
policy, including its objectives for growth and employment” (Rodgers, 1998, p. 93), a 
formulation broadly comparable to those of the Bundesbank and the ECB. The MPC had nine 
members, the Governor and two Deputy Governors, two other senior BoE staff, and four 
‘external’ members appointed by the Chancellor. The first three were appointed for five year 
renewable terms, the last six for three year renewable terms. The government retained 
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responsibility for deciding the exchange rate regime, but the BoE had a pool of foreign 
exchange reserves which it could use at its own discretion in support of its monetary policy. 
Banking supervision (together with a large number of staff) was transferred from the BoE to 
the new Financial Services Authority, and debt management was transferred to the new Debt 
Management Office, an agency of the Treasury.  
 
The big innovation to the monetary policy framework was the allocation of interest rate 
decisions to the MPC (in the previous few years the BoE Governor made formal 
recommendations on interest rates, which were published with a six week lag, to the 
Chancellor who then took the decisions). The target was set by the government, and in 
principle re-set every year in the Budget, but the only change over the period was from 2.5% 
on the RPIX to 2% on the CPI (a UK version of the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
used in the euro area).3,4 In addition, the BoE increased the resources it put into forecasting, 
and further developed the quarterly Inflation Report, in which it continued to publish the fan 
chart forecasts it had initiated in February 1996. Accountability was provided through various 
mechanisms, including an annual report to Parliament and regular appearances by senior BoE 
personnel before the Treasury Select Committee. 
 
In terms of the standard indices of central bank independence, Cobham, Cosci and Mattesini 
(2008) assess the BoE’s independence on the Cukierman, Webb and Neyaptı (1992; 
Cukierman, 1992) unweighted index as rising to 0.70 (on a maximum of 1.0), from 0.57 since 
1993 and 0.31 before that. On the Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) indices, Cobham 
et al. evaluate the BoE’s political independence as rising from 1 (out of 8) in 1971-97 to 1.5, 
and its economic independence as rising from 4 (out of 8) in 1971-93 through 5 in 1993-97 to 
8 from 1997.5 At the same time the BoE became one of the most transparent of major central 
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banks, doing significantly better than the Fed or the ECB on the Eijffinger-Geraats (2006) 
index, and being the only central bank to score 1.0 on the Laurens, Arnone and Segalotto 
(2009) measure of transparency. 
 
The announcement of the new framework was well received – for example, the Economist 
(1997) described it as “an astonishingly bold start… The move was welcome and overdue” –  
and the immediate impact in the financial markets was a significant fall in government bond 
yields. As Chadha, Macmillan and Nolan (2007) have shown, medium and long-term yields 
fell by some 50 basis points (bps) between the days before and after the announcement, a fall 
which they interpret as the result of the new framework demonstrating an increase in the 
policymakers’ aversion to deviations of inflation from target and vindicating the change in 
framework.  
 
A less sophisticated but longer term perspective on this phenomenon is provided in Figure 2, 
which shows the spreads between UK and German bond yields, and between French and 
German bond yields, over a 30 year period.6 UK and French spreads over German yields 
were falling on balance over the 1980s and 1990s, and a particularly sharp fall in the UK 
spread can be seen in the second half of 1997 and again in 1999. By 2000 the UK spread was 
in line with that of France which was now in a currency union with Germany. The French 
spread remained close to zero until the financial crisis in late 2007 and, in particular, the 
development of the euro crisis in 2010. The UK spread, however, rose somewhat in 2003, but 
stayed well below its levels of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
(2) Inflation and economic activity 
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Figure 3 shows the outturn for inflation, on both the CPI and the RPIX, with the respective 
targets shown by dashed lines. Over the RPIX target period, from 1997 Q2 to 2003 Q4, 
inflation on the RPIX averaged 2.40% as against the target of 2.5%, and it never deviated 
from the target (in either direction) by more than 1%, the level which under the framework 
requires the BoE Governor to write an open letter to the Chancellor explaining why the 
deviation has occurred, how long it is expected to last and what measures have been taken to 
eliminate it.  
 
Over the CPI target period from 2004 Q1 to 2010 Q2, CPI inflation averaged 2.39% as 
against the target of 2%, but this can be divided between the Great Moderation years up to 
2007 Q4 when it averaged 2.01% and the crisis period 2008 Q1 to 2010 Q2 when it averaged 
2.99%.7 CPI inflation rose to a peak of 4.77% in 2008 Q3, fell back to 1.50% in 2009 Q3 but 
was back to 3.43% in 2010 Q2, and the Governor was obliged to write letters about the 
inflation deviations to the Chancellor in April 2007, June, September and December 2008, 
March 2009, and February and May 2010. The fluctuations in inflation reflect a number of 
factors, of which the most important were the movements in energy prices, the sterling 
depreciation of 2007-8 and the larger than expected pass-through from that, and the 2.5% 
VAT cut from December 2009 to December 2010.8 Consumer inflation expectations (for 12 
months ahead), however, although they rose briefly in 2008, remained otherwise close to the 
target throughout the period, and expectations for longer horizons (and expectations in the 
financial markets) were always close to target;9 this may reflect in part the high degree of 
transparency noted above. 
 
Figure 4 shows the outturns for three indicators of economic activity: the percentage change 
in GDP since four quarters before, the unemployment rate (Labour Force Survey) and a 
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pseudo output gap, measured as the deviation of GDP from a linear and quadratic trend 
estimated over the period 1975 Q1 to 2008 Q4.10 Before the crisis economic growth 
fluctuates but is always positive and generally strong, with a 1997 Q2 to 2007 Q4 average of 
3.27%. After that, however, it deteriorates sharply with a 2008 Q1 to 2010 Q2 average of -
1.79%. Unemployment, which had been on a declining trend since 1993 Q4 (when it was at 
10.3%), continued to fall though more slowly after 2001, reaching a low of 4.7% at the end of 
2004 and then hovering around 5.2% until 2008, when it began to rise more strongly, with a 
peak of 8.0% in 2010 Q1. The output gap, on the simple measure used here, fluctuates in the 
pre-crisis period between lows of -1.4% in 1997 Q1 and 2006 Q4 and a high of 2.0% in 2003 
Q4, but falls sharply from early 2008 to reach -14.5% in 2010 Q2. 
 
What this all amounts to is good economic performance between 1997 and 2007, with low 
and relatively stable inflation, constant and solid growth, and declining or low 
unemployment; but a sharp deterioration from late 2007 or 2008 in both inflation, which was 
repeatedly higher than expected, and growth, which fell sharply. Unemployment also rose, 
but by less than might have been expected and in 2010 it was still below the levels of the 
much shallower recession of the early 1990s. Good performance in the first decade was partly 
due to exogenous and/or international factors (Stock and Watson, 2003; Bernanke, 2004; 
Bean, 2005), but the fact that the UK did better than the US or the euro area (see below) 
suggests policy played a role as well as luck. 
 
(3) The behaviour of the MPC 
The introduction of the new framework broadly coincided with the fashion for Taylor-rule-
type estimates of central banks’ reaction functions initiated by Clarida, Galí and Gertler 
(1998). Studies of the reaction function of the MPC over (parts of) our period include those 
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by Adam, Cobham and Girardin (2005), Goodhart (2005) and Cobham and Kang (2012a). 
Adam et al. (2005), who were particularly concerned with the role of overseas interest rates 
in earlier subperiods and used the GMM approach of Clarida et al., found for the 1997-2002 
period a well-defined relationship between the UK interest rate and the standard domestic 
variables (inflation and the output gap) with overseas interest rates entering as instruments for 
those variables but not as independent variables in the reaction function. According to their 
results the MPC reacted strongly to inflation deviations, so that the Taylor principle was 
clearly fulfilled.  
 
Goodhart (2005) adopted an alternative approach to estimating the reaction function, in 
which he used what he called ‘ex ante forecasts’ of inflation and output growth, constructed 
by using the parameters from the BoE’s published macroeconometric model to ‘subtract’ the 
effect on inflation and output growth of the policy rate changes decided by the MPC in the 
previous quarter from the published (ex post) forecasts, so as to obtain the forecasts the MPC 
would have had in front of it before it took its interest rate decisions. He then used these 
forecasts to estimate, for the period 1997 Q3 to 2003 Q3, the effect of forecast deviations of 
inflation and output growth from target and trend on the change in policy interest rates. The 
Taylor principle was again fulfilled, but the new findings were that policymakers seemed to 
respond most strongly to forecast deviations seven or eight quarters ahead, instead of the 
three to four quarters ahead typical of the standard GMM estimates, and that there was no 
place for gradualism, or interest rate smoothing. In both respects Goodhart’s results were 
closer to what the MPC says, and informed believers understand, about its own behaviour. 
 
The contrast between these two approaches was examined in more detail and over the whole 
of the pre-crisis period by Cobham and Kang (2012a). In a search over a wider grid of 
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horizons they find that the standard GMM estimation fits best for horizons of three or four 
quarters on inflation and one quarter on the output gap,11 while the ex ante forecast approach 
fits best for horizons of seven or eight quarters for inflation and one quarter for output 
growth. The latter are both closer to what the MPC claims to do and more in line with the 
BoE’s publications on the transmission mechanism. In addition, under the ex ante forecast 
approach (but not under the standard approach) there is no need for interest rate smoothing to 
ensure a good fit. On these ex ante forecast estimates the Taylor principle is clearly satisfied, 
with the policy rate rising in the next quarter by over 1% in response to a 1% inflation shock. 
What this suggests is that the MPC did indeed follow its mandate, reacting strongly and fully 
to keep inflation broadly on target, and without interest rate smoothing.12 
 
(4) International comparisons 
Table 1 provides some international comparisons, for the euro area and the US and their 
central banks, over the period 1999 Q1 to 2007 Q4 (we consider the later period in section 
VI). First, on these data (CPI data from IFS, which should be comparable), UK inflation was 
well below that in the euro area, which was in turn well below that in the US. Secondly, 
output growth (measured as the four quarter change in GDP, comparable data from IFS) was 
highest in the UK and lowest in the euro area. It was also less variable in the UK. Thirdly, the 
output gap data, constructed as the residuals from a linear and quadratic trend up to 2008 Q4, 
also suggest that growth was less variable in the UK than in the US or the euro area. Fourthly, 
the nominal policy rate was on average higher in the UK and lower in the euro area, so that 
the real policy rate (measured ex post as the nominal rate minus inflation) was much higher in 
the UK than in the other areas, while the difference between the nominal policy rates in the 
US and the euro area was broadly equal to the difference in their inflation rates so that their 
real policy rates were similarly low. Fifthly, the ratios of the variability of the policy rate to 
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those of inflation, growth and the output gap suggest that the BoE was rather less ‘activist’ in 
this period than the Fed, but not clearly less so than the ECB. 
 
All three currency areas experienced good economic performance in these years, as the result 
of some combination of good policy and good luck. However, the comparisons present 
something of a puzzle: in terms of inflation and growth the UK’s economic performance 
looks good compared to that of the US or the euro area, but this performance was 
accompanied by significantly higher interest rates. If spreads were the same in all currency 
areas (relevant data are not easily available so this is not clear), UK borrowers were in some 
sense worse off (and depositors better off). In a world of capital mobility and liberalised 
financial markets it seems highly unlikely that the differences could reflect differences in 
equilibrium real interest rates. In that case the obvious potential explanation is that the higher 
UK interest rates were associated with the sterling overvaluation discussed in the next section 
which may in turn have been associated with continuing (but, until 2007-8, falsified) 
expectations of depreciation. 
 
(5) Appointments to the MPC 
External members of the MPC are appointed for terms of three years which are renewable. 
These features are regarded within the literature on central bank independence as limits on 
independence, since the possibility of reappointment could motivate members to act in a way 
which would make reappointment more likely. In addition, for most of the period MPC 
appointments were entirely a matter for the Chancellor, who for many years rejected demands 
from the House of Commons Treasury Committee to be able to influence appointments. From 
2007, however, MPC vacancies were advertised, and from 2009 there was a more formal 
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appointment procedure involving an interview panel which made recommendations to the 
Chancellor.13  
 
The new framework specified that external MPC members would be people with relevant 
knowledge or experience, and the initial appointments – Alan Budd, Willem Buiter, Charles 
Goodhart and DeAnne Julius – certainly fulfilled that criterion. Over time the balance swung 
slightly away from members with strong academic backgrounds towards those with more 
business or City of London backgrounds and then back towards academics.14 However, while 
there has been criticism of some individual appointments there has been no strong claim that 
the people appointed have been consistently lacking in technical expertise, on the one hand, 
or with partisan political sympathies, on the other.15 
 
One particular issue which concerned a number of external members in the early years, but 
was then addressed, was the question of research support for externals. Initially the latter had 
no resources, in the form of economists, allocated to them to carry out investigations that 
would allow them to support their arguments in the committee, whereas the internal members 
could draw on the full capacity of the Monetary Analysis group of economists. However, in 
late 1999 it was agreed to establish a small unit of economists to service the external 
members, each of whom subsequently had a few members of staff working for and reporting 
to them. This appears to have resolved the issue satisfactorily. 
 
III.   Open economy issues 
The UK’s exchange rate had been flexible, in principle and in practice (that is, there was no 
significant intervention16), since the exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 
September 1992, an event which had strongly affected the economic credibility of the 
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previous government.17 The focus of the new monetary framework announced in May 1997 
was naturally on changes from the existing (1993-7) framework. Given that the new 
framework involved no significant change on that score little was said about sterling. 
However, it is striking that in the more substantial defences of the new framework (Balls, 
1998; Balls and O’Donnell, 2002) there are arguments against the old exchange rate targets 
but virtually nothing about the likely behaviour of the exchange rate under the new 
framework. Balls (1998), for example, mentions open macroeconomics and (once) open 
economy macroeconomics but contains no references to anything that could be regarded as 
analysing open economy issues.18 There are of course arguments that a flexible exchange rate 
will automatically behave in an accommodating and helpful way under inflation targeting, 
but those arguments were not made in these writings. 
 
What happened to sterling over the period was that the sharp appreciation which had started 
under the old regime continued through to late 1997, by when the nominal effective exchange 
rate was some 10% higher than the average for 1984-96, which covered the supposed 
overvaluation in the 1990-92 ERM period as well as the sharply lower rate that followed 
(Figure 5). At the time it was widely agreed that sterling was overvalued.19 However, that 
level was broadly maintained until 2008, with the effective rate changing little even in the 
face of the sharp depreciation and then appreciation of the euro against the dollar. Moreover, 
while costs and prices could have been expected to respond to this shift, the real effective 
exchange rate was also largely unchanged between mid-1997 and late 2007, at a level some 
27% above the average for 1984-96. Sterling then fell sharply in 2008, which brought the 
nominal effective rate back to a little below its 1994-5 level but left the real rate still some 




Whether a high exchange rate matters or not depends among other things20 on its possible 
effects on the balance between tradable and non-tradable goods production and the 
implications of changes in that balance for overall output and growth (and subsequently, 
perhaps, for developments at the more micro level such as relative earnings and income 
inequality). That it did so matter is suggested by Figures 6 (a) and (b), which show the 
growth of manufacturing, as a proxy for tradables, and services, as a proxy for non-tradables. 
Figure 6(a) shows a sharp fall in the growth rate of manufacturing around 1980 (the time of 
an earlier sharp appreciation), and both figures show a similar phenomenon from 1997: over 
the 1997-2007 period manufacturing more or less stagnated while services grew at a 
significant and consistent pace and, since services constitute a much higher share of GDP, the 
latter also grew broadly in line with services. Other factors were, of course, involved in the 
particularly rapid relative decline of UK manufacturing, but it is hard to believe that the 
exchange rate was not important. 
 
The response of the monetary policymakers up to 2005 is analysed in detail in Cobham 
(2006), which argues that the MPC was well aware of what was happening, but was not able 
successfully to forecast ex ante or even explain ex post the movements in the sterling 
exchange rate. In addition, there was no way the misalignment could be addressed within the 
new monetary framework: arguments about reducing interest rates to try to undo the 
overvaluation were always overruled by arguments about the need to keep to the inflation 
target. In the depreciation between late 2007 and early 2009 the MPC continued to forecast 
the exchange rate in the same way as it had done since late 1999 – an average of the 
expectation that could be backed out from the relationship between foreign and domestic 
interest rates, on the assumption that uncovered interest parity holds, and the prediction of a 
constant exchange rate implied by a random walk model. This meant that the MPC was 
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continuously and substantially wrong about the exchange rate. It adjusted its starting point to 
the reality, but then typically forecast a small further depreciation rather than the much larger 
depreciations that took place between November 2007 and May 2008, and between August 
2008 and February 2009.21 Moreover, the MPC was again unable to explain the depreciations 
ex post: relative interest rates could not explain much if anything, cyclical factors and 
downgrades to the markets’ view of the UK’s long-term prospects might explain a part, but 
much of the depreciation had to be ascribed to rises in the risk premium on sterling.22 In 
terms of its policy actions, however, it seems clear that the MPC acted to manage overall 
aggregate demand (in order to hit its inflation target), so that in effect it encouraged the more 
responsive output of non-tradables and services (while the output of tradables was 
constrained by the lack of competitiveness). The current account of the balance of payments 
was negative throughout but, for most of the period, not enormously so.23 
 
In short, it appears that open economy and exchange rate issues were neglected in the design 
of the new monetary framework. The actual movements of sterling were associated, at the 
least, with a profound change in the structure of output. But neither the movements nor the 
change could be addressed within the framework, not least because movements in sterling 
were typically erratic, not just in small short term fluctuations but in the two major sustained 
fluctuations over this period.  
 
With reference to the puzzle highlighted in II(4) above, it is possible that a (sustained) 
expectation of depreciation (which the MPC may have shared with the markets, and whose 
inflationary consequences it may have feared) obliged the MPC to keep the UK policy rate 
significantly higher than international rates. Alternatively, it is theoretically possible that 
loose fiscal policy in the UK obliged the MPC to set the policy rate high in order to avoid 
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excess demand, and that in turn encouraged the overvaluation of sterling. But this argument 
could not apply to the earlier part of the overvaluation, when fiscal policy in the UK was tight 
both absolutely and relatively to the US and the euro area, and it seems doubtful that it is 
valid for the later part, when UK fiscal policy was a bit looser than that in the euro area but 
quite similar to that in the US. This issue clearly deserves further research. 
 
IV. The vexed question of EMU 
The Labour government came to power in a period when the Conservative government had 
suffered severe tensions over the EMU project, tensions which had not been assuaged by the 
opt-out from EMU which the government had secured in the Maastricht treaty negotiations in 
December 1991 or by the UK’s forced exit from the ERM in September 1992. It was natural 
that Labour, in opposition and in government, should be wary about the issue,24 and within a 
few months of its election (October 1997) the Chancellor announced a set of five ‘economic 
tests’ which the government would use to decide whether it was in the UK’s economic 
interest to adopt the euro: 
• are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we and others could live 
comfortably with euro interest rates on a permanent basis? 
• if problems emerge is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them? 
• would joining EMU create better conditions for firms making long-term decisions to 
invest in Britain? 
• what impact would entry into EMU have on the competitive position of the UK’s 
financial services industry, particularly the City’s wholesale markets? 




The Treasury’s October 1997 assessment of these tests, a report of some 40 pages, stated that 
the UK economy was not yet sufficiently ‘converged’ with that of the euro area, and not yet 
sufficiently ‘flexible’ for joining the euro to be a success. 
 
A further, more substantial, assessment was published in June 2003 (Treasury, 2003). This 
was the result of a major exercise by the Treasury, probably the largest piece of sustained 
research it has ever undertaken, with the 240 pages of the report being accompanied by 18 
separate studies (some of them as large as the report itself) covering topics from business 
cycle convergence, through housing market structures and the equilibrium exchange rate of 
sterling against the euro, to the location of financial activity and the euro. In the course of the 
exercise the Treasury consulted a range of outside economists, including both those 
sympathetic to UK euro entry at some point and those clearly opposed, as well as others with 
more intermediate positions. The conclusion of the assessment was that, while progress had 
been made since 1997 on both convergence and flexibility, that progress was not yet enough. 
As Keegan (2003, 327-8) puts it, “There was something for everyone, in that the ‘pro euro’ 
camp could point to microeconomic benefits from greater competition, a lower cost of capital 
and closer trading links… microeconomic considerations taken together could… lead to a 
small increase in the economy’s long term growth rate. On the other hand, the Treasury’s 
reservations about subjecting the British economy to the ‘one-size-fits-all’ monetary policy 
were loud and clear, and, although the exchange rate had recently fallen towards more 
realistic levels, [the report] concluded that the economy was some way from ‘sustainable 
convergence’.”25 
 
There are essentially two different ways of evaluating this exercise. The first views it as an 
outstanding example of how policy decisions should be made: wide consultation on both 
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policy and purely technical issues, with full account taken of the range of views on all 
relevant subjects, allowing an informed and comprehensive evidence-based conclusion. The 
second views it as an example of a highly politicised strategy in which all sides are consulted, 
so that no one can complain that their views have been ignored, the reader is drowned in a 
mass of often highly technical material so that the overall issue becomes opaque and obscure, 
and in the end the political authorities can reach the conclusions which they prefer for largely 
political reasons.  
 
Those conclusions may also have been affected by the political reality that it would almost 
certainly have been very difficult to obtain a majority in favour of UK euro entry in the 
referendum to which the government had committed itself. But commentators such as 
Keegan (2003, pp. 325-7) and Richards (2010, p. 177) have emphasised that Gordon Brown 
as Chancellor was concerned that joining the euro could be a significant mistake for the UK 
economy.26 
 
With hindsight it is easy to argue that the government made the right choice in not joining the 
euro. The report’s emphasis on insufficient flexibility can be read as recognising the danger, 
highlighted in the so-called Walters critique, that price and cost levels in the euro area 
countries could become increasingly inconsistent, and there is no doubt that divergences in 
competitiveness were a growing problem in the euro area before the crisis.  But it is hard to 
find in the report itself or the studies that accompanied it anything that could be regarded as 
predicting the more specific difficulties which befell the eurozone from the spring of 2010, 
mainly because the focus was on whether euro entry was (yet) appropriate for the UK, rather 
than on whether the euro union and its monetary and other arrangements were intrinsically 
well structured. Before the financial crisis the Treasury paid little attention to the financial 
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stability issues that became so important from 2010 (banking union, common deposit 
insurance, joint financial supervision, etc), and with respect to fiscal coordination the report 
was broadly supportive of the Stability and Growth Pact, but without much emphasis on the 
matter. It should also be noted that no proponent of entry in the early 2000s advocated entry 
at the existing exchange rate or in the existing conditions. 
 
V. The new framework and the eruption of the crisis 
Although Labour politicians sometimes portrayed the financial crisis as an exogenous shock 
originating outside the UK (and it is true that the US housing market made a special and 
major contribution to the crisis via the asset-backed securities acquired by banks outside the 
US), there is a line of argument which says that the monetary frameworks – in the UK as well 
as elsewhere – may have contributed to the eruption of the crisis. Borio and White (2004; see 
also Borio and Lowe, 2002) argued that western economic, monetary and financial systems 
had evolved in a way that made asset price booms and busts more likely. They noted that in 
recent years there had been lower and more stable inflation and lower short run output 
volatility, but more prominent credit and asset price booms and busts, and a higher incidence 
of financial crises. Moreover, these phenomena had appeared in the presence of more 
liberalised financial regimes, in which banks had been less constrained, and of monetary 
regimes in which central banks had been firmly committed to price stability (under formal or 
informal inflation targeting).  Borio and his colleagues suggested that these changes to 
financial and monetary regimes, with the relaxation of financial and monetary constraints, 
might have increased the scope for the growth of financial imbalances during phases of 





One way of making this argument more precise is to focus on the expectations engendered by 
different policy regimes. Under inflation targeting central banks take trouble to explain their 
reaction functions to the private sector and the markets, so that the latter will expect that a 
rise in inflation will be met with a rise in interest rates, and this helps to stabilise inflation 
expectations. But this refers to the inflation which central banks are targeting – inflation in 
goods and services. Meanwhile, as the result of financial liberalisation firms and households 
find it easier to borrow, where much of that borrowing is to fund transactions in assets of 
different kinds, and there is no mechanism which limits actual or expected asset prices. In 
fact, major central banks took the view that monetary policy should not concern itself with 
asset prices as such (though they should react to any asset price bust which would affect real 
economic activity and so inflation). This behaviour, often characterised as the ‘Greenspan 
put’ but promoted by a wider range of central banks and central bankers, implied a floor to 
asset prices but no ceiling, so it arguably encouraged risk-taking in asset markets. In this way 
inflation targeting could have permitted or even promoted asset price booms alongside stable 
goods and services inflation. 
 
In addition to the nature of the climate fostered by central bankers’ stated attitudes to asset 
prices, there is the question of the way central banks in fact reacted to the rises in house 
prices which were crucial to the eruption of the financial crisis. The rises in the UK are 
shown in Figure 7, which also shows the Halifax house price/earnings ratio. House prices had 
been rising strongly under the previous regime but they then went through a series of cycles, 
with successive peaks at 13%, 17%, 26% and 20% before falling back into line with goods 
and services inflation at 2% in mid-2005. House price inflation then rose again, this time to a 
final peak of 11% in May 2007. All of this brought about an almost continuous rise in the 
house price/earnings ratio (whose previous highest peak had been 5.0 in 1989), from under 
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3.5 in most of the 1990s to a peak of 5.8 in mid-2007. In short, the house price rises in this 
period were very large by historical standards.   
 
The response of the monetary policymakers to this phenomenon has been examined in detail 
(for the Fed and the ECB as well as the BoE) in Cobham (2013). That analysis shows that up 
until 2005 the MPC examined house price growth and its determinants with care, typically 
concluding that the growth was the result of fundamental factors, notably the long term 
decline in inflation and interest rates, rather than a speculative boom. But after 2005 (and 
after the departure of Nickell, the MPC member who had been most active in this regard) the 
MPC seems to have paid much less attention to the renewed rise in house price inflation.27 In 
any case, there is no evidence that interest rates were ever changed in response to the 
movements in house prices.28 On the contrary, the committee repeatedly articulated the 
orthodox view (which goes back to Bernanke and Gertler, 1999) that monetary policy should 
not react to asset price growth but should stand ready to respond if asset prices crashed. The 
only MPC member through the period who was sympathetic to the alternative view, the 
proposal that policy should ‘lean against the wind’ of asset price rises, was Wadhwani, who 
contributed (while he was on the committee) to the two most prominent expositions of this 
view (Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani, 2000; Cecchetti, Genberg and Wadhwani, 
2002).  
 
It is, of course, not clear that leaning against the wind (LATW) was compatible with the 
MPC’s remit, which was to target inflation in goods and services (as measured by the RPIX 
and then the CPI). Cecchetti et al. (2000, 2002) argued that it was so compatible, especially 
since the MPC could choose to focus on a slightly longer time horizon than the two years it 
was currently using and since, as they emphasised, under LATW monetary policy would be 
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reacting to asset price misalignments rather than targeting asset prices. On the other hand, the 
proposal appeared to critics such as Allsopp (2010) to amount to the addition of an extra 
target, which might become more important in certain situations but would remain in the 
background at other times. However, the issue of its compatibility with the MPC’s remit was 
never the main issue in this debate, insofar as it took place in and around the MPC, for the 
orthodox opponents of LATW concentrated on arguments about the difficulty of identifying 
asset price misalignments and the potentially serious side-effects on the real economy of 
LATW-inspired interest rate rises (see also Bean et al., 2010). 
 
What emerges from this discussion for the evaluation of monetary policy in the period is this: 
the new framework may have contributed to a climate in which asset prices were freer to rise, 
and the MPC did not attempt to use interest rates to restrain house price inflation although 
some critics think it should have done so. However, it should also be said that action by and 
in the UK alone is unlikely to have had much effect on the eruption of the crisis, and even on 
its incidence in the UK, in the absence of similar action in the US, which was the dominant 
economy in the world and the one whose house price rises, fuelled by sub-prime lending, had 
the most impact on US and other banks’ balance sheets. 
 
VI. Policy in the early years of the crisis 
For the UK the eruption of the crisis first took the specific form of the near collapse of 
Northern Rock in September 2007. In response the UK authorities (BoE29 and government in 
cooperation) announced liquidity support for Northern Rock and then, a few days later, term 
auctions for liquidity against a broader than usual range of collateral. A Special Liquidity 
Scheme launched by the BoE in April 2008 allowed banks to exchange mortgage-based 
assets for Treasury bills. Northern  Rock was nationalised in February 2008, and Bradford & 
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Bingley in September 2008, while the Lloyds TSB/HBOS merger went through in September 
2008 with government support. Finally, the government announced a major bank rescue 
package in October 2008, under which it acquired large shares in the equity of RBS and the 
Lloyds Banking Group. 
 
These measures were not monetary ones, for they had no intrinsic effect on either interest 
rates or the monetary aggregates. The monetary policy response came first in December 
2007, with a 0.25% cut in the policy rate (which had been raised to 5.75% in July). The rate 
was cut by a further 0.25% in each of February and April 2008. Then in October, following 
the collapse of Lehmans in September and the consequent freezing of the interbank market, 
the MPC cut the rate from 5% to 4.5% in October (a cut coordinated with the Fed and the 
ECB), 3% in November and 2% in December 2008, and then to 1.5% in January, 1% in 
February and 0.5% in March 2009. At the March meeting the MPC also decided to embark 
on what came to be called quantitative easing, under which it purchased securities – almost 
entirely gilts – in the secondary market in exchange for increased reserves held by the banks 
at the BoE.30 
 
The March 2009 decision was for £75 bn of asset purchases, but the programme was 
extended by a further £50 bn in each of the May and August meetings, and a final £25 bn in 
November 2009. The entire amount of £200 bn was purchased in a relatively smooth and 
consistent manner, with the last purchases in January 2010. The size of the programme 
remained at £200 bn until it was expanded in October 2011, in what is often referred to as 




QE was intended to be a form of monetary expansion at a time when the interest rate was at 
the effective lower bound: at its March 2009 meeting the MPC “remained concerned that a 
further reduction [in the policy rate] could have some adverse impacts on the economy, given 
its effects on the profits that banks and building societies were able to make through the 
spread between their deposit and lending rates. Deposit rates could not be reduced much 
further, and if these institutions were contractually obliged to pass on cuts in Bank Rate to 
some of their borrowers, that would squeeze their profits further, and potentially reduce 
lending capacity. In addition, a sustained period of very low interest rates could impair the 
functioning of money markets, creating difficulties in the future, when interest rates needed 
to rise.” On the other hand, asset purchases financed by the creation of bank reserves “were 
necessary in order to increase nominal spending growth to a rate consistent with meeting the 
inflation target in the medium term. Such operations were a natural extension of the 
Committee’s usual monetary policy operations. Given the Bank’s role as monopoly supplier 
of sterling central bank money, the Committee had previously chosen to influence the amount 
of nominal spending in the economy by varying the price at which it supplied central bank 
money in exchange for assets held by the private sector. Under the operations now under 
consideration, the Committee would instead be focusing more directly on the quantity of 
money it supplied in exchange for assets held by the private sector.” (MPC Minutes, March 
2009, §§27, 30).  
 
This policy was considered highly innovative at the time of its introduction (though the Fed 
began similar operations, described as large scale asset purchases, LSAPs, around the same 
time) and has subsequently been classified as ‘unconventional monetary policy’, but it is not 
far from the kind of operations the BoE undertook on a regular basis in the 1970s and 1980s 
when it bought, or more typically sold, gilts to influence the growth of broad money.31 In the 
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context of a decade and a half of inflation targeting and then the crisis, however, bold 
measures were called for and QE was indeed audacious, and the Labour government as well 
as the BoE deserve credit for that. 
 
There have been a number of attempts to identify the effects of QE on inflation and real 
economic activity. Initial work concentrated on the effect on long-term interest rates, which 
seemed to be considered the main transmission channel (although the BoE’s first statement 
on this, by Benford et al., 2009, had discussed a range of channels), but later work went on to 
consider the wider effects. An article in the BoE’s Quarterly Bulletin (Joyce et al., 2011) 
reported a number of estimates of the peak effect of QE on real GDP and CPI inflation taken 
from ongoing research at the Bank, with a range for GDP of 1.5-2%, and for CPI inflation of 
0.75-1.5%. Another investigation which focused more directly on broad money and  its 
relation to nominal GDP found a somewhat larger impact (Cobham and Kang, 2012b). On the 
other hand, a recent survey by Martin and Milas (2012) argues that much of the effects on 
long-term interest rates were only temporary, and that later QE programmes in the UK and 
the US were less effective than the first ones.  
 
However, the crucial issue in trying to estimate the effect of QE is the appropriate 
counterfactual: what would have happened if QE had not been implemented? The answer to 
that is not obvious, particularly but not only if the analysis is focused on the effect of QE on 
broad money.32 But anecdotal evidence suggests that most UK macroeconomists believe that 
the outturn for real GDP, at least, would have been much worse in the absence of QE, that is 




Finally, it is interesting to complete this section by extending the data in Table 1 above, as in 
Table 2 (which omits the output gap data because of the difficulty of identifying meaningful 
gaps in the crisis period). The first part of the table covers 2008 Q1 to 2010 Q2, the part of 
the crisis under the Labour government, and the second part covers the whole period from 
1999 Q1 (when ECB data is first available) to 2010 Q2. In the crisis period the UK has higher 
average inflation and lower average growth than the US or the euro area; the nominal policy 
rate remains higher on average than that of the US though lower than that of the ECB, but the 
real policy rate is no longer out of line with that in the US in the same way as before. For the 
whole period the main distinctions highlighted in section II(4) are still there: the UK has 
lower average inflation and slightly higher average growth (though growth is now more 
volatile), together with higher nominal and real policy rates. On the other hand, the ratio of 
the standard deviations of the policy rate and inflation suggests that in both the crisis and the 
overall periods the BoE was, on this score, more ‘activist’ than the Fed or the ECB. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
There can be no doubt that the monetary framework from 1997, which built on the changes 
introduced in 1993-4 but went beyond them with the crucial move towards BoE 
independence, was a major improvement on what went before. Credibility, transparency and 
accountability were improved and the simple outturns for inflation and growth, as shown for 
each period of government in Table 3, show much better inflation and, compared to the two 
previous governments, better growth.33 During the Great Moderation, in particular, the 
economy performed strikingly well overall. Moreover, the claim that ‘boom and bust’ had 
been eliminated was true for that period – and indeed for the whole period if ‘boom and bust’ 
is understood to refer to the effects on economic activity and inflation of irresponsible and 




However, under the new framework the MPC was unwilling or unable to address the issue of 
the sterling misalignment, which must have contributed to the growing imbalance in the 
economy, between tradables and non-tradables and between manufacturing and services. The 
MPC was also unwilling or unable to respond to the house price boom, of which at least a 
part seems unlikely to have been based on changes in the fundamentals. Moreover, the latter 
failure contributed to the incidence and the depth of the financial crisis that occurred at the 
end of the period. 
 
It should also be noted that the MPC’s remit and the new monetary framework as a whole 
were closely modelled on what was regarded as best practice in academic circles, particularly 
in the US. Its neglect of the exchange rate issue was in line with much of macroeconomic 
thinking in the US, where the economy is less open because of its size and the exchange rate 
is much less important. Its neglect of asset prices more generally was also in line with the 
dominant trends in US and other macroeconomic analysis.34  
 
Overall, the design and operation of monetary policy were much better under the 1997-2010 









1 The UK policy rate over the Labour government period was also lower but more variable 
than that in the 1992 Q4 to 1997 Q1 ‘IT without independence’ period: its mean and standard 
deviation were 6.1 and 0.5 in the earlier, and 4.6 and 1.8 in the later period. 
2 For discussion of inflation targeting per se see Roger (2010) and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010); 
for more detail on the UK variant see Cobham (2002) and Besley and Sheedy (2010).  
3 The reason for changing to a different index has never been completely clear, but the 
reduction to 2% was not intended to mean a substantial policy change, since it was thought 
that 2% on the CPI was roughly equivalent to 2.5% on the RPIX. See Nickell (2003) and 
Besley and Sheedy (2010). 
4 Moreover, the UK inflation target from 1997 was always clearly symmetric, so that 
deviations in either direction were equally undesired. For the ECB, by contrast, its initial 
formal definition of price stability as inflation of less than 2% was widely (but wrongly) 
interpreted as asymmetric. 
5 These assessments include judgments with respect to the BoE’s newfound instrument, but 
not goal, independence, which is not well covered in these indices. The main reason why 
political independence remained so low was that the Governor and board continued to be 
appointed by the government, and there were no legal provisions which protected the BoE 
from government pressure. 
6 German bond yields can be taken as indicating market expectations of long term inflation in 
a country with full central bank independence and high credibility. The data are from the 
world tables of International Financial Statistics: the definitions of bond yields are not 
entirely consistent across countries, so what is important here is the changes in the spreads 




7 In the RPIX period CPI inflation averaged 1.32%, as against 2.4% on the RPIX. Over 2004-
7 RPIX inflation was 2.66% as against 2.01% on the CPI, and between 2008 Q1 and 2010 Q2 
RPIX inflation was 3.47% as against 2.99%. Thus with the exception of the final period it 
could be argued that the switch to CPI in fact allowed a small rise in inflation. 
8 See, for example, the Inflation Report for November 2010, section 4; Fisher (2010) and 
Bean (2010).  
9 See, for example, the Inflation Report for August 2008 chart 4.7; February 2009 chart 4.14; 
and May 2010 chart 4.12 and the box on ‘Recent movements in households’ inflation 
expectations’, p. 37. 
10 ONS data. The aim was to measure the deviation from what potential GDP would have 
been expected to be in the absence of the crisis. It seems unlikely that trend GDP would have 
been affected before end-2008. 
11 Cobham and Kang also show that the standard approach suffers from a weak instruments 
problem. 
12 The existence of data on the votes of individual MPC members has spawned a literature 
which examines possible differences between members and types of member, e.g. 
Bhattacharjee and Holly (2006), Besley et al. (2008), Gerlach-Kristen (2009) and Hix et al. 
(2010). The findings of these papers are mixed, with few clear results overall; and the 
differences identified are relatively small. 
13 There has also been concern about the lateness and speed with which appointments were 
often made. See, for example, Financial Times (2007). 
14 A simple classification between academic, UK economic policy (i.e. Bank or Treasury) 
experience and business/City backgrounds, allowing for people to be split between two 
categories, suggests 1.5 to 2.5 academics in the early years, 1 only in the 2004-5 period but 2 




15 However, Hix et al. (2010) claim to have identified a ‘political business cycle’ element in 
appointments of external members, in the sense that more ‘dovish’ members were appointed 
in the run-up to elections and more ‘hawkish’ ones in post-election years. 
16 However, Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) classify the UK’s exchange rate regime as 
managed floating from 1993 to 2000 and as a de facto moving band on the euro from 2001 to 
2007. 
17 It could also have affected that of the then Labour opposition, which had also supported 
ERM membership, but this was largely avoided (Keegan, 2003: chapter 5). 
18 The word ‘open’ is used mainly with reference to transparency and accountability. 
Similarly, the references in Balls and O’Donnell (2002) list nothing by open economy 
economists such as Frankel, Obstfeld or Rose, and none of the open economy work of Rogoff 
or Calvo. 
19 See, for example, the MPC minutes for August 1997, para 58. 
20 We have already seen that inflation and economic growth were relatively good in this 
period. 
21 In November 2007, for example, the Inflation Report expected the Bank’s sterling effective 
rate index (ERI) to depreciate gently from 102.6 in the run-up to the forecast to 101.0 in 2009 
Q4. In August 2008, with a starting point of 93.1 the expectation was for a depreciation to 
91.9  in 2010 Q3. The corresponding outturn figures were 80.8 and 79.9. 
22 See, in particular, the Inflation Report for August 2008 p. 12, and February 2009, pp15-16. 
23 Between 1997 and 2007 the current account deficit varied between 0.1% and 3.2% of GDP, 
with an average of 1.9%. Over the following three years the deficit was 1.4, 1.5 and 3.3% of 
GDP. US deficits, on the other hand, averaged 4.2% of GDP for 1997-2007. (OECD data) 
24 In addition, Keegan (2003) has drawn attention to a 1992 Fabian Society pamphlet by Ed 




25 With respect to the points made in the preceding section, it should be noted that the study 
on the exchange rate and macroeconomic adjustment contains a wide range of references to 
work on open economy macroeconomics and the determination of exchange rates, but 
dismisses rather quickly the possibility that flexible exchange rates can be destabilising rather 
than stabilising. 
26 It is also widely believed that the issue of the adoption of the euro became a highly 
politicised element within the arguments between the prime minister and the chancellor.  See 
for example Naughtie (2002: 130-33, 141-6) and Keegan (2003: ch. 12). 
27 Muellbauer and Murphy (2008) also argue that UK house prices were not clearly 
overvalued in 2005, but they concede that “By mid-2007, however, prices looked a little 
overvalued, even without the rise in interest rates between 2006 and 2007” (p. 12).  
28 The MPC also paid little attention to the rate of growth of M4 lending or M4 itself, both of 
which were relatively high in the mid-2000s before the crisis. 
29 It is widely thought that the BoE, and Governor King in particular, were slow and reluctant 
to respond to the initial problems at Northern Rock and to the wider problems in the banking 
system in the early part of the crisis (see, for example, Giles, 2012; Darling, 2011, 56-8). 
30 The Asset Purchase Facility at the BoE had been set up in January 2009 to purchase high-
quality private sector paper, in order to improve the functioning of markets, but those 
purchases were financed by additional sales of Treasury bills by the Debt Management 
Office. 
31 See Banque de France (2010), Borio and Disyatat (2010) and Nelson (2013) for further 
discussion of the background to and nature of QE. 
32 See Bridges and Thomas (2012) and Cobham and Kang (2012b) on the ‘offsets’ to QE 




33 There are, of course, many qualifications which can be made on these figures, e.g. with 
respect to changes between periods in the international environment and with respect to the 
inheritance and legacy of different governments. But the differences are large enough to 
suggest that the new framework was indeed an improvement. 
34 It may be noted that Besley and Sheedy (2010) make almost no mention of the exchange 
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Table 1: International comparisons, 1999-2007 
 inflation output growth output gap 
 mean s.d.σπ min max mean s.d.σg min max s.d.σy min max 
UK 1.56 0.56 0.61 2.84 3.17 0.86 1.29 4.69 0.84 -0.82 2.40 
Euro area 2.09 0.44 0.79 2.90 2.30 1.12 1.06 4.45 1.43 -1.86 3.28 
US 2.71 0.76 1.25 3.97 2.84 1.26 1.00 5.38 1.43 -0.94 4.57 
 
 policy rate real policy rate ratios of s.d.s 
 mean s.d.σi min max mean s.d.σr min max σi/σπ σi/σg σi/σy 
BoE 4.81 0.74 3.5 6.00 3.25 0.96 2.10 5.39 1.30 0.85 0.87 
ECB 3.03 0.89 2.00 4.75 0.94 0.91 -0.35 2.60 2.03 0.80 0.62 
Fed 3.63 1.85 1.00 6.50 0.91 1.62 -1.62 3.31 2.42 1.47 1.28 
 
Notes: data for 1999 Q1 to 2007 Q4; inflation is CPI as in International Financial Statistics (IFS); output growth is since four quarters before; 
output gaps are residuals from linear and quadratic trend estimates on data up to 2008 Q4; policy rate data are end-quarter; real policy rates are 
ex post, i.e. nominal policy rates minus inflation. 





Table 2(a): International comparisons, 2008-2010 Q2 
 inflation output growth 
 mean s.d.σπ min max mean s.d.σg min max 
UK 2.98 0.94 1.46 4.81 -1.79 3.42 -6.87 3.07 
Euro area 1.71 1.44 -0.38 3.86 -1.26 2.75 -5.28 2.35 
US 1.81 2.20 -1.62 5.30 -0.97 2.86 -5.02 3.51 
 
 policy rate real policy rate ratios of s.d.s 
 mean s.d.σi min max mean s.d.σr min max σi/σπ σi/σg 
BoE 2.03 2.05 0.50 5.75 -0.96 1.84 -2.94 2.87 2.19 0.60 
ECB 2.13 1.36 1.00 4.00 0.41 0.51 -0.61 1.38 0.94 0.49 
Fed 0.80 0.84 0.25 2.25 -1.01 1.59 -3.30 1.87 0.38 0.30 
 
Table 2(b): International comparisons, 1999-2010 Q2 
 inflation output growth 
 mean s.d.σπ min max mean s.d.σg min max 
UK 1.87 0.89 0.61 4.81 2.10 2.71 -6.87 5.21 
Euro area 2.01 0.79 -0.38 3.86 1.52 2.19 -5.28 4.45 
US 2.52 1.28 -1.62 5.30 2.01 2.34 -5.02 5.38 
 
 policy rate real policy rate ratios of s.d.s 
 mean s.d.σi min max mean s.d.σr min max σi/σπ σi/σg 
BoE 4.20 1.63 0.50 5.75 2.33 2.11 -2.94 5.39 1.84 0.60 
ECB 2.83 1.08 1.00 4.75 0.82 0.87 -0.61 2.60 1.36 0.49 
Fed 3.01 2.05 0.25 6.50 0.49 1.80 -3.30 3.31 1.60 0.88 




Table 3: Average inflation and growth by governments 
government: prime minister GDP growth (4 quarter) Inflation (RPI) 
1964 Q4-1970 Q2: Wilson 2.58 4.38 
1970 Q3-1974 Q1: Heath 3.63 8.68 
1974 Q2-1979 Q2: Wilson/Callaghan 1.68 15.80 
1979 Q3-1997 Q2: Thatcher/Major 2.10 8.35 
1997 Q3-2010 Q2: Blair/Brown 2.29 2.70 


































Figure 6(a): GDP, manufacturing and services, 1948-2004 












Figure 7: House prices 
